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RECENT DECISIONS
An interesting consideration in the instant case is the theory
upon which the plaintiff intends to prove a contract. He is suing as
his child's administrator, for damages due to conscious pain and
suffering prior to death, pursuant to Sections 119 and 120 of the New
York Decedent Estate Law."1 This right of action is that which
the decedent would have possessed had not death intervened, and
whatever damages are recovered form part of his estate.1 2 The New
York rule is that ". . . an implied warranty of . . . fitness for a
particular purpose as against . .. a retailer does not inure to the
benefit of a third party who is a stranger to the contract . "1... I
Likewise, since a parent is not presumed, unless so authorized, to
act as agent for his child,'1 4 the basis upon which the deceased child's
privity of contract with the defendant retailer will be established is
not immediately apparent. However, in Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe
Co.,"" the court, after stating the rule above quoted, went on to in-
dicate the possibility that under certain circumstances an exception
to this general statement might exist.16 It may well be that the facts
in the instant case will constitute one of the situations the court
there envisioned.
In conclusion, it is suggested that the decision under consid-
eration might well have rested upon Section 48, subdivision 3 of the
Civil Practice Act, rather than upon subdivision 1 of the same sec-
tion. The same result would thus have been attained as to the in-
stant case, but without the undesirable effect of nullifying the legis-
lative effort to establish different limitation periods for property
damage and personal injury actions.
X
TORTS- ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FOR DEFAMATION IN JUDICIAL
PROcEEINGS.--Plaintiff sued to recover for damages suffered as a
result of two allegedly defamatory statements included by Justice Pette
in an opinion written by him 1 and subsequently published, as a mat-
"1 N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW §§ 119, 120. An action for wrongful death pur-
suant to Section 130 was barred by that section's special two-year period of
limitation.
12 See Stutz v. Guardian Cab Corp., 273 App. Div. 4, 10, 74 N. Y. S. 2d
818, 824 (1st Dep't 1947) ; Matter of von Kauffmann, 167 Misc. 83, 84, 3 N. Y.
S. 2d 486, 487 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
13 Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., 276 N. Y. 172, 176, 11 N. E. 2d 718, 719
(1937).
14 Strawn v. O'Hara, 86 Ill. 53, 56 (1887); see Mott v. Scholes, 147 App.
Div. 82, 85, 131 N. Y. Supp. 811, 814 (2d Dep't 1911); McDonald v. City of
Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N. E. 476, 478 (1918) ; see 67 C. J. S. 795.
Is See note 13 supra.
16 Id. at 177, 11 N. E. 2d at 719; see Fagan, Sales and Security Law, 26 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 72, 81 (1951).
1 The statements were from an opinion written by a United States dis-
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ter of course, in the New York Law Journal. By way of defense,
Justice Pette claimed judicial privilege, asserting the judicial character
and official authorization of the Law Journal. As a further defense,
the defendant pleaded privilege under Section 337 of the New York
Civil Practice Act, good faith and truth. Both sides moved for sum-
mary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. In granting the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court held that both
the judicial immunity and the privilege extended by Section 337 to
persons publishing a full and fair report of a judicial or legislative
proceeding were sufficient defenses to the present action. Bradford
v. Pette, 129 N. Y. L. J. 2021, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. June 16, 1953).
A study of the law of defamation evinces a marked conflict be-
tween the right of an individual to the protection of his good reputa-
tion, and the interest of society in uninhibited discussion and com-
munication. In this conflict, the latter principle of public policy often
prevails, and an invasion of personal rights is permitted. Although
even a malicious invasion of rights is accorded an absolute privilege
in some circumstances,2 the occasions on which any invasion is allowed
are few in number and exceptional in character.
"You have not done your duty; you have disobeyed my com-
mands: you are a sedious [sic], scandalous, corrupt, and perjured
jury." 3 When these words were spoken by Justice Skinner in 1772,
and a subsequent indictment against him was quashed, the principle
of absolute immunity for defamation in judicial proceedings became
firmly established.4 This absolute immunity relieves a judge from
civil liability 5 or criminal indictment 6 for any act done or omitted
to be done by him while acting in his judicial capacity. Even acts
which are in excess of jurisdiction and alleged to have been done
maliciously and corruptly,7 and without regard for falsity,8 are en-
compassed by the privilege. Although a judgment may have proved
erroneous, and its consequences injurious, a judge may not be held
trict judge [Bradford v. Harding, 108 F. Supp. 338 (E. D. N. Y. 1952)], and
from the uncontradicted affidavits of a police officer of the City of New York.
2 See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351 (U. S. 1871); Gans v. Calla-
ghan, 135 Misc. 881, 882, 238 N. Y. Supp. 599, 600 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd tnem., 231
App. Div. 737, 245 N. Y. Supp. 744 (2d Dep't 1930).
3 Rex v. Skinner, Lofft 54, 55, 98 Eng. Rep. 529 (K. B. 1772).
4 It was in 1772 that Lord Mansfield reiterated the comprehensive rule,
although many more cases of like import may be found in the Year Books.
See Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N. Y. 1810).
5 Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12 (1878); Karelas v. Baldwin, 237 App.
Div. 265, 261 N. Y. Supp. 518 (2d Dep't 1932); Gans v. Callaghan, supra note
2; Yates v. Lansing, szpra note 4; Houghton v. Humphries, 85 Wash. 50,
147 Pac. 641 (1915).
6 See Yates v. Lansing, mipra note 4 at 291; Ange v. State, 98 Fla. 538,
123 So. 916, 917 (1929).
7 Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (U. S. 1871); see Mundy v. McDonald,
216 Mich. 444, 185 N. W. 877, 880 (1921).
s See PRosssa, ToRTs 823 (1941); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 585 (1938).
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responsible9 if he acted in his official character, in the course of a
judicial proceeding.' 0 The remedy for judicial misconduct is not
civil action, but censure or removal."
A judge need not ascertain at his peril whether his statements
are relevant to the case before the court.' 2 The doctrine of absolute
privilege in respect to the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
is not limited, as in the case of suitors and counsel, to matters that
are pertinent and relevant.13 The rule of absolute privilege must bd
such, for to secure a free and independent administration of justice,
a judge must be free to act fearlessly and without regard to personal
consequences.' 4 Where a judge acts without jurisdiction, i.e., where
there is a complete absence of power and authority to try a case,
and he is aware of it, his rulings are nullities and no immunity exists.' 5
Developing concurrently with the privilege extended to judges, we
find the same protection accorded to jurors 16 and to other partici-
pants in judicial proceedings,' 7 limited, however, by the requirement
that all their acts must be in the character of a participant and rele-
vant to the cause'18
9 Sweeney v. O'Dwyer, 197 N. Y. 499, 90 N. E. 1129 (1910) ; Hammond
v. Howell, 1 Mod. 184, 86 Eng. Rep. 816 (K. B. 1674) ; 2 Mod. 218, 86 Eng.
Rep. 1035 (K. B. 1677).
19A judicial proceeding includes any trial or inquiry before a court of
justice or any other tribunal lawfully exercising a judicial function. See
Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COL. L.
REv. 463, 484 (1909) ; see Karelas v. Baldwin, 237 App. Div. 265, 268, 261 N. Y.
Supp. 518, 521 (2d Dep't 1932) (The doctrine has been applied to the court
of a coroner and to a court martial which is not a court of record.); see
Aylesworth v. St. John, 25 Hun 156 (N. Y. 1881) (proceedings before a jus-
tice of the peace).
11 See Bradley v. Fisher, supra note 7 at 350; Karelas v. Baldwin, supra
note 10 at 267, 261 N. Y. Supp. at 519; see RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 585 (1938).
22 See Karelas v. Baldwin, szpra note 10 at 267, 261 N. Y. Supp. at 520;
Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868).
13 See Marsh v. Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309 (1872) ; see Karelas v. Baldwin,
supra note 10 at 266, 261 N. Y. Supp. at 519.
14 See Valesh v. Prince, 94 Misc. 479, 481, 159 N. Y. Supp. 598, 599 (Sup.
Ct. 1916), aff'd inein., 177 App. Div. 891, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1133 (2d Dep't
1917), aff'd nere., 224 N. Y. 613, 121 N. E. 985 (1918); Karelas v. Baldwin,
supra note 10 at 268, 261 N. Y. Supp. at 521; Gans v. Callaghan, 135 Misc.
881, 882, 238 N. Y. Supp. 599, 600 (Sup. Ct), aff'd mem., 231 App. Div. 737,
245 N. Y. Supp. 744 (2d Dep't 1930).15 See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351 (U. S. 1871). A reporter need
not ascertain whether all jurisdictional requirements have been complied with,
and his publisher is not liable for publishing a full and fair report. Lee v.
Brooklyn Union Pub. Co., 209 N. Y. 245, 103 N. E. 155 (1913).
18 See Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 292 (N. Y. 1810).
17 See Youmans v. Smith, 153 N. Y. 214, 47 N. E. 265 (1897) (privilege
of counsel); Moore v. Manufacturers' Nat. Bank of Troy, 123 N. Y. 420,
25 N. E. 1048 (1890) (privilege of party litigants-libellous matter contained
in, defendant's answer) ; White v. Carroll, 42 N. Y. 161 (1870) (privilege of
witness).Is Moore v. Manufacturers' Nat. Bank of Troy, supra note 17; see Youmans
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Although the immunity extended to the participants in a judicial
proceeding was unquestioned at common law, an anomalous situation
existed inasmuch as there was no correlative right to publish the
report of the proceedings in the newspapers or elsewhere.19 In New
York in 1854, the right to publish a fair and true report of any judi-
cial, legislative or other official public proceeding was unequivocally
granted by statute.20 Prior to the passage of this statute, a news-
paper publishing ex parte proceedings containing defamatory material
would not be protected.2 1 Under the statute, however, protection was
extended to a publisher in such a situation.22
The privilege created by the statute of 1854 was at first re-
stricted to publications in newspapers,2 and the requirement persisted
that no actual malice exist.24  The present statute, Section 337 of
the New York Civil Practice Act, on the other hand, extends the
privilege to all publications, 25 and there is no longer any express re-
quirement of freedom from actual malice.26
The structure of judicial immunity, erected and reinforced over
the years, was apparently shaken in the decision of Murray v.
Brancato.27 In that case, a judge of the Kings County Court was
accused of composing deliberate, personal, malicious and vituperative
statements concerning a well-known member of the bar of the State
of New York, and setting forth these statements in two judicial
opinions.28 He caused these opinions to be sent to the New York
Law Journal and the New York Supplement, with an accompanying
letter specifically requesting their publication. So unusual was it
for a judge, acting in his judicial capacity, to be held liable in a civil
action for defamation, that Judge Brancato's sole defense was ab-
solute privilege in the performance of a judicial act. However, no-
v. Smith, supra note 17 at 219, 47 N. E. at 266; see White v. Carroll, supra
note 17.
19 See SEELMAN, LAW OF LIBE. AND SLANDER § 209 (1933).
2 Laws of N. Y. 1854, c. 130, § 1.
21 Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sand. 21 (N. Y. 1850).22 See Stuart v. Press Pub. Co., 83 App. Div. 467, 476, 82 N. Y. Supp. 401,
406-407 (1st Dep't 1903); Salisbury v. Union & Advertiser Co., 45 Hun 120,
123 (N. Y. 1887).
23 Laws of N. Y. 1854, c. 130, § 1; N. Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1907 (1916).
24 Ibid.
25 Laws of N. Y. 1940, c. 561, § 1 (privilege accorded to "... any person,
firm or corporation. . . ."). This statute is also incorporated in N. Y. PENAL
LAW § 1345. See also, DRAFTSMAN'S NOTE TO PENAL LAW § 1345 of McKIN-
NEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWs ANNOTATED.
21 Laws of N. Y. 1930, c. 619, § 1 (deleted the words "without proving
actual malice").
27 290 N. Y. 52, 48 N. E. 2d 257 (1943).
28 The first allegedly libellous opinion charged that plaintiff had attempted
to win delay of a trial in order to have the case come before a judge of plain-
tiff's choice. The second allegedly libellous opinion implied that plaintiff had
not acted in good faith in the matter.
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where in the opinion is an attempt made to prove that he was per-
forming a judicial act, because it is never intimated that the New
York Law Journal and the New York Supplement are anything but
unofficial publications.
The case arose on an application for judgment on the pleadings,29
an extremely limited type of procedural motion where usually no affi-
davits may be considered or submitted.30 The judgment is based
solely on the pleadings, admissions,3 ' bills of particulars and formal
stipulations.3 2 In the narrow confines of such a proceeding, with
only the prescribed information before them, the court in the Murray
case proceeded to shake the stronghold of judicial immunity and to
re-define its boundaries. The majority of the court refused to grant
the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and found
that the allegations were sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In
so doing, the court stated that the law imposes no duty upon a judge
to publish opinions in unofficial reports, and when a judge sends
opinions to the New York Law Journal and the New York Supple-
ment he is not performing a judicial act, and thus he may be held
liable as would any private person.33 Refusing to consider the ac-
tions of the defendant in forwarding the opinions to the New York
Law Journal and the New York Supplement as official acts, the court
rationalized that to do so might sanction deliberate publications of
malicious and injurious matters in law reviews, popular magazines
or the daily press. The court opined that no imperative public pol-
icy pointed to an extension of the immunity from liability into such
neighboring fields.
Although the Murray case was a startling aberration in the field
of judicial immunity, does it represent a true threat to that prin-
ciple? An examination of all the circumstances of that case leads us
to reach a negative conclusion. The court was necessarily restricted
by the paucity of information before it, and by the fact that only the
single defense of absolute privilege was interposed. Judge Finch,
in a most forceful and logical dissent,3 4 pointed out the shortcomings
of the Murray case. The defendant there neglected to plead, and
the court consequently refused to apply, Section 337 of the New York
Civil Practice Act although it conjectured as to whether this section
would protect a judge who publishes his own opinion. The defen-
dant did not attempt to prove the judicial character of his act al-
though he may have shown the judicial purposes served by the New
29 N. Y. R. CIV. PRAC. 112.
30 See PRASHKER, NEw YoRK Pacric 379 (2d ed. 1951).
31 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. ACT § 476.3 2 See Lefler v. Clark, 247 App. Div. 402, 404, 287 N. Y. Supp. 476, 479
(1st Dep't 1936).
33 Murray v. Brancato, 290 N. Y. 52, 48 N. E. 2d 257 (1943).
34 In which Judge Lewis and Judge Conway concurred.
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York Law Journal 3r and the New York Supplement. 6
The present case is thoroughly distinguishable from Murray v.
Brancato. Whereas the dearth of information in the Murray case
hampered the court's decision and forced it to leave unanswered many
interesting questions, such was not the case in Bradford v. Pette.
There the comprehensiveness of the decision was made possible by
the nature of the proceeding-a motion for summary judgment.37 In
such an inclusive setting,38 the court was able to supply the answers
to the questions left open in Murray v. Brancato. Whereas Judge
Brancato pleaded only judicial immunity, Justice Pette overlooked no
possible defense. He asserted his judicial privilege and denied that
he was engaged in anything other than an official judicial act. He
repudiated any affirmative action on his part in causing the publica-
tion of the opinion, for, having composed and written the opinion, he
delivered it to the clerk for filing in accordance with Rule 72 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure 3 9 and from that point had nothing more to
do with it. Its subsequent publication in the New York Law Jour-
nal was pursuant to a contract authorized by the Judiciary Law, and
entered into between the publisher and the Justices of the Appellate
Division in the Second judicial Department.40 The mere filing of
Justice Pette's opinion with the county clerk was not the proximate
cause 41 of any injury which might have been sustained as the result
of its subsequent publication by the New York Law Journal. 42  In
35 See Murray v. Brancato, supra note 33 at 60, 48 N. E. 2d at 260 (dis-
senting opinion) (The New York Law Journal has been designated as the
official newspaper of the First Judicial Department for the publication of cal-
endars and official notices.).
36 Id. at 63, 48 N. E. 2d at 262 (dissenting opinion).
37 N. Y. R. Civ. PRAc. 113. Both sides moved for summary judgment.
38 Defendant had included a variety of exhibits and affidavits which could
not have been; included in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Some of
these exhibits consisted of: a copy of the opinion written by the district courtjudge; a copy of the allegedly libellous opinion which had appeared in the
Law Journal; a copy of the affidavit of the arresting officer; a copy of the
complaint and warrant of arrest of plaintiff; a copy of the police blotter report
showing the arrest of plaintiff; and a copy of the police report showing dis-
position of the case, and additional exhibits and affidavits.
39 "When an opinion . . . is delivered at or before the order is filed, it shall
be filed with the order. . . . Such opinion shall be a part of the record on
which the order is made."
40 "The justices of the appellate division in the second department . . . are
hereby authorized to contract . . . for the payment to the owner of the daily
law journal . . . for publishing calendars, decisions, opinions . . . and other
similar matters relating to the courts in the second and tenth judicial dis-
tricts ...... N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 91(2).
41 Defamatory statements made in the presence of, and with the intention
that they be published by, third parties, in the absence of any affirmative acts,
are not the proximate cause of an injury sustained by the subsequent publi-
cation. Schoepflin v. Coffey, 162 N. Y. 12, 56 N. E. 502 (1900); Lewis v.
Chemical Foundation, Inc., 233 App. Div. 287, 251 N. Y. Supp. 296 (4th Dep't
1931).
42 When defendant ascended the bench, there was in practice an estab-
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the Bradford case, Section 337 was affirmatively pleaded. In its
amended state, the statute has been construed so as to apply to anyone
publishing a fair and true report. To deprive a person of this statu-
tory privilege merely because he is the judge who rendered the
opinion would be an illogical interpretation of the statute.
Justice Pette did not neglect to plead good faith, and his good
faith and proper motives cannot be doubted.43 His were no intem-
perate comments concerning the person of the plaintiff, but objective
statements obtained from records of the former proceedings in which
the plaintiff was involved. With the abundance of evidence before
it, the court could hardly do other than grant defendant's motion for
summary judgment and deny plaintiff's motion.
Whether or not the case of Bradford v. Pette gives expression
to the law of this state, and whether the case of Murray v. Brancato
will be relegated to the archives as one of the many cases to be
"limited to its facts," are questions which must be left to a decision
on appeal. Suffice it to say that the thoroughness and scope of jus-
tice Hill's decision in the Pette case will constitute a landmark in
the field of judicial immunity.
It is unlikely today that a case similar to the Murray case in
its facts would be decided by the Court of Appeals in the same man-
ner if the defenses pleaded in the Bradford case were set forth.
Section 337 alone would appear to be a complete defense to anyone
publishing a fair and true report of a legislative or judicial pro-
ceeding.44 If, however, Section 337 would have been a complete de-
fense, it is difficult to understand why the majority of the court in
the Murray case specifically stated that ". . . the publication of judi-
cial and legislative proceedings in unofficial reports is privileged
only if made in good faith and from proper motives." 4> It would
seem that the court harbored a doubt as to whether the deletion of
the words "without actual malice" from the statute in 1930 was in-
tended to change the common-law rule of liability where actual malice
could be proved. 46 Although it would appear from the plain import
lished routine whereby decisions and opinions were prepared for prompt pub-
lication in the N. Y. Law Journal. An employe of the N. Y. Law Journal
called for the allegedly libellous opinion in accordance with a daily custom
and practice. In Murray v. Brancato, the opinions were sent by the judge
with a letter specifically requesting their publication.
43 Where the immunity accorded to judges and legislators is inapplicable,
and where the immunity conferred upon publishers of fair and true reports
of official judicial proceedings cannot be asserted, publication of such proceed-
ings in unofficial reports may nevertheless be privileged if made in good faith
and from iroper motives. See Murray v. Brancato, 290 N. Y. 52, 58, 48 N. E.
2d 257, 259 (1943).
44 See Farrell v. N. Y. Evening Post, Inc., 167 Misc. 412, 415, 3 N. Y. S.
2d 1018, 1021 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
45 Murray v. Brancato, supra note 43 at 58, 48 N. E. 2d at 259 (emphasis
added).
46 Id. at 59, 48 N. E. 2d at 260.
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of the language used that Section 337 was intended to protect the
publication of all fair and true reports whether published maliciously
or not, it is submitted that such an intendment is contrary to all
principles of justice and decency, and should not be attributed to the
legislature. Such an interpretation would make it possible for a
malevolent judge to include harsh, sarcastic, and irrelevant defama-
tory matter in a judicial opinion and forward copies to the daily press
and periodicals of general circulation. However true it may be that
the public is entitled to know all matters of public interest, the posi-
tion that a statute could be intended to protect startling vituperation
and railing denunciation is untenable. Censure or removal of a judge
would appear to be inadequate for conduct so malicious, resulting in
great harm to individual reputation.
Although the Pette case decides that Section 337 would protect
a judge who affirmatively acts to publish his own opinions, it is sub-
mitted that with regard to strictly unofficial publications, the require-
ment of freedom from actual malice should attach.
With such a qualification, the Pette case is undoubtedly correct
in according the protection of Section 337 to a judge in the same man-
ner as to any other individual. To further clarify the issue, it is
suggested that the New York Law Journal and the New York Sup-
plement be accorded the judicial status which they so justly deserve.
It cannot be doubted that they both form a constituent part of the
judicial process, being cited by attorneys and judges and circulating
valuable legal information to members of the legal profession.
X
TORTS - LAST CLEAR CHANCE - DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGE RE-
QUtRED.-Deceased, having negligently entered a subway tunnel, was
struck by a train of the defendant six hundred feet from the nearest
station. The train was stopped three times by the release of an emer-
gency brake before an investigation was conducted which revealed
the body. One of several ways that this brake could be actuated was
by a mechanism, suspended before each car, striking an object on the
tracks. The Court of Appeals, in granting a new trial, held that
the doctrine of last clear chance was applicable since defendant had
knowledge of facts from which he could have deduced possible dan-
ger, and yet failed to take appropriate action. Kitmkumian v. City
of New York, 305 N. Y. 167, 111 N. E. 2d 865 (1953).
Under the doctrine of last clear chance an injured plaintiff, al-
though his contributory negligence placed him in a position of peril,'
' See Mast v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 79 F. Supp. 149, 160 (N. D. Iowa 1948),
aff'd, 176 F. 2d 157 (8th Cir. 1949); Lee v. Pennsylvania R. R., 269 N. Y.
[ VOL. 28
